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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this study is to carry out a comprehensive and robust analysis of the determinants of the capital structure of the 
Federation Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) companies at the industry level. A large number of hypotheses of different classes 
of theories are tested. Estimating the dynamic panel models using the system of generalized method of moments (GMM) 
estimator, we captured both cross-sectional and inter-temporal relationships between the leverage in companies and its 
determinants. The results show that profitability, collateral value of the assets and the risk, measured by earnings volatility, 
negatively affect company's  leverage, while inconsistent results were for the relationship between different proxies for firm's 
future growth opportunities and leverage, whereby the firm size overall has no relationship with the firm' s leverage. The 
findings reflect the transitional nature of the FBiH corporate environment.They suggest that some of the insights from modern 
finance theory of capital structure are applicable in the FBiH in that certain firm-specific factors that are relevant for explaining 
capital structure in developed economies are also relevant in the FBiH. Overall, the empirical evidence presented in this Study 
finds it difficult to demonstrate the validity of the trade-off and the pecking order theories as stand-alone models. The Study’s 
results also point at several unique aspects of financing behavior in developing countries, from which specific implications for 
further research follow. 
 
Keywords:  capital structure, transition economy, pecking order theory, trade-off theory 
 
 
 Introduction  1.
 
Determinants are variables successfully used as leverage predictors. A large number of factors have been identified in 
the extent literature that influence the financing decisions of companies based on financial theories of capital 
structure.However, there is no consensus in the literature whether such theories adequately explain the capital structure 
adopted by firms in the context of developing economies. Therefore, this chapter empirically investigates the effects of 
firm-specific determinants on firms 'capital structure. Of course, for a number of reasons, we would expect the capital 
structure to vary considerably across industries and moreover, for the capital structure to vary among firms within a given 
industry. In an attempt to clarify those variations, the academics and practitioners have developed a number of theories 
and the theories have been subjected to many empirical tests. 
This Study is an attempt to give a comprehensive and robust analysis of the determinants of the capital structure of 
FBiH firms at the industry level to reveal the differences between the industries in the capital structure during the period of 
ten years including the economic up - and down turns. The empirical analysis focused on 10 years (2003-2012) of the 
data on a sample of private non financial companies in order to test the relationship between the capital structure and the 
leverage determinants, combining all variables affecting the determination of the capital structure. The explanatory 
variables included in the model vary across both firms and time and in our empirical investigation we use two capital 
structure measures.  
This Study will answer the question as to which factors determine the capital structure of FBiH companies and 
whether existing financial theories of capital structure hold true in that context. The determinants of the capital structure 
decisions should guide companies on how to choose their strategic financing mix. In other words, this research results 
may draw the attention on those factors, which are worth considering if the corporate structure is determined. Those 
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findings will certainly advance our understanding of a firm's financing behavior. 
Such a Study would contribute to the current references in several ways. Firstly, as far sa we are aware, it is the 
first attempt at a direct testing of the affect of company variables on the capital structure decisions in the companies in the 
FBiH. Secondly, despite the fact that there is evidence that features of an industry do matter in the capital structure 
decisions of companies, we are yet to find a study that examines  variations across industries in the capital structure 
decisions in the companies in FBiH. To our knowledge, there no empirical work that focuses on inter-industry variation in 
the financing decision of firms in FBiH. As in other developing countries, FBiH government sometimes institute policy 
interventions to foster investment in certain sectors/industries by way of subsidies and directed credit. Understanding the 
place of the industry factor in the financing decisions of a firm is crucial for the purpose of crafting appropriate policy 
interventions. In the context of FBiH, there is no published work that investigates the dynamic partial adjustment of a 
firm's capital structure. This chapter aims to fill this gap by investigating whether firms in our sample adjust their capital 
structures to a certain target level. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The next section lays out the firm-level determinants of capital 
structure. Section 3 provides explains the construction of variables, with the specification of the hypothesis presents the 
research methodology and models and discusses the empirical models. Section 4 reports the statistical analysis and 
empirical results. The findings and conclusions are presented in the last section. 
 
 Empirical Literature Review 2.
 
The firm's capital structure can be determined through several factors. Those observable elements for leverage should be 
linked to the theories on the capital structure  since they are the assumed proxy for the forces that underpin theories, 
such as the ¿nancial distress and information asymmetry costs. However, the this relationship is not always clear, and 
hence it is important to resolve the elements that are reliable and economically important in order to predict the leverage. 
Some of the attributes which affect the choice of capital structure are the same for firms within the same industry. 
However, the effects of some of these attributes, for example, type of output market and type of products, are not testable 
because these attributes themselves are not easily measurable. Therefore, in the table below the existing theoretical 
framework are set out to explain the determinants of the capital structure.  
 
Table 1. Summary of the Capital Structure Theories Predictions 
 
No Variables Static trade-off theory Asymmetric information theory TBT Agency POT ST 
1 Firm Size + + - + 
2 Profitability + + - + 
3 Growth opportunity - - + + 
4 Asset tangibility + + +/-
5 Tax shield -
6 Risk - + -
7 Dividend policy - + +/- 
8 Uniqueness of product -
9 Managerial equity ownership - + +/- 
 
Source: H. Asgharian, Essays on capital structure, 1997, p.41 
 
Note: The table shows the expected effects of different attributes on capital structure, as implied by the capital structure 
theories. TBT refers to the tax-bankruptcy static trade off theory. POT denotes the pecking order theory. ST refers to the 
signalling theory. The + (-) sign shows the expected positive (negative) relationship between the leverage and the 
designated variable. The (+/-) sign signifies the possibility that plausible arguments could be made for a positive as a 
negative relationship using a given theory. * The profitability has a positive sign for Static trade of theory, whether the 
Dynamic one foresees the negative sign. 
Fifty years after Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) made their ground-breaking analysis, there is yet no unifying theory 
on the capital structure for the corporate ¿nance. Despite this, the applicable theories serve as analytical tools in order to 
probe the empirical ¿ndings. However, none are capable of explaining all the aspects in the capital structure choice. Even 
though some of the stylized facts can be successfully accounted for in each theory , there are incongruities with some of 
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the others. The current reference materials say that the most reliable elements explaining the corporate leverage are the 
market-to-book ratio (–), tangibility (+), profitability (–), company size (+), expected inÀation (+), and median industry 
leverage (+ effect on leverage). Frank and Goyal (2009) refer to these factors as the “core leverage factors” affecting the 
decisions on the capital structure. On the sample of publicly traded U.S. firms from 1950-2003, they examined an 
extensive list of elements which could arguably reason why there is heterogeneity between capital structures across 
companies.  With a market-based definition of leverage, they found out that those six factor account for more than 27% of 
the variation in leverage, while another 19 factors improve the explanatory power of the model by only 2%. Furthermore, 
those six core factors provide a more powerful explanation of a market-based definition of leverage than a book-based 
definition of leverage. According to the authors if focus would be on a book-based definition of leverage, the market-to-
book ratio, firm size and expected inflation would have all have been excluded from the core model (Bessler, et.al, 2011). 
The table below provides the summary of selected empirical findingsregarding the relationship between chosen 
firm-specific characteristics and leverage. 
 
Table 2. Summary of Empirical Evidence from Selected Empirical Studies  
 
Summary of empirical evidence from selected empirical studies
Study Determinants of capital structureFirm size Profitability Growth opportunity Asset tangibility Risk 
Bradley et.al (1984) + - 
Kim and Sorensen (1986) - + 
Kester (1986) - + * 
Friend and Lang (1988) * - + * 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) + - - + - 
Asgharian (1997) + - + + 
Titman and Wessels (1998) - +/- * * * 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) - + - 
Fan, Titman and Twite (2003) + - - + 
Flannery and Rangan (2006) + - * + 
Antoniou et.al (2008) + - - + * 
Talberg et. al (2008) - - - + 
Clark et al. (2009) + * * 
Chang et al. (2009) +/- +/- +/- +/- 
Frank and Goyal (2009) + - - + 
 
The + (-) sign indicates a significant positive (negative) relationship between leverage ratio and the capital structure 
determinant. The * designates an included but insignificant variable in the model. Empty cells mean that there was no 
testing of the variable. 
Anotherimportant remark to be done is those "six core factors" together only explain about 25% of the total 
variation. Additionally a recent paper of Lemmon, Roberts and Zender, (2008) argues that determinants of traditional 
leverage explain a minor part of the leverage variation (30% at most), while 60% is yet to be explained. The foregoing 
variation stemming from an unobserved firm-specific, time-invariant component responsible for the persistence of 
leverage ratios over time. Due to the fact that the authors focused  on the economy in the US, which can be considered 
as relatively stable economy, it is actually unclear if the leverage ratios show a similar level of persistence if there are 
rapid changes in the economic environment over time (Shamshur, 2012). Therefore, a Study like this one, is more than 
welcome when carried out using the example of a transitional economy.  
The theory of capital structure has developed considerably in the last ten years, but empirical work is still far from 
analyzing all the implications of the theories. Research into the empirical corporate ¿nance gave many studies that tried 
to identify those elements which are driving the company's capital structure. The evidence on the capital structure 
determinants is strong between companies and various countries. These studies greatly differ in terms of the sample 
selection, variable de¿nition, sample period, sample size, and the econometric methodology.  
Obviously, there is no uniformity when it comes to the theoretical predictions or empirical results. Empirical 
research has been restricted by difficulties in finding appropriate proxies for attributes which are supposed to determine 
the capital structure of a company. In addition, the use of book versus market value for measuring the firm's equity and 
assets differs among studies. 
Consistent with the above-mentioned study, but having in mind the availability of data required to calculate those 
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variables, this Study includes a following set of firm level variables that capture the factors that are known to affect the 
capital structure: the firm size, profitability, growth opportunities, asset tangibility and earnings volatility. What follows is a 
brief description of each of them and the development of hypothesis in accordance with the dynamic tradeoff theory. 
Namely, recent literature critiques the studies on determinants of capital structure on the grounds that they do not 
take into account the typical rebalancing behavior of firms as far as their capital structure is concerned. It draws on 
dynamic trade-off theory and develops a theory for dynamic capital structure (Flannery & Hankins 2007). We may group 
the literature on the study of dynamic capital structure into two succinct clusters:  (i) those investigating whether firms 
adjust towards a target capital structure; and (ii) those investigating the factors that influence the pace at which firms 
adjust their capital structure. This Study analyses the first one.  
 
 The Empirical Framework 3.
 
The empirical analysis focused on 10 years (2003 – 2012) data pertaining to a sample of non-financial firms in Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBIH). The current study examines the influence of firm level factors in the determination of 
basic capital structure. As this Study involves an examination of the determinants of inter-industry differences, the firm-
specific data used for the analyses in this chapter was extracted from the financial statements of non-financial, privately 
owned, listed as non-listed firms in FBiH. The analysis carries out both for the entire sample and for the individual 
industries.  
The main research objectiveisto estimate the effects of firm’s level determinants on their capital structure measures 
in different industries.Considering the research objective, the relevant research question is whether the stylized relation 
between capital structure measures and several firm level variables obtained from the literature can be generalized to 
firms in FBiH. This brings us to the following hypotheses: 
9 Firm level variables such as the firm size, profitability, growth opportunity, asset tangibility, risk are statistically 
significant determinants of capital structure measures.  
Most of the research studies on capital structure have used the data from the US and European companies. This 
Study provides a unique opportunity to examine the validity of the above statements and whether the capital structure of 
FBiH firms can be explained by the finance theory. Survival and growth necessitates the resources, but financing of these 
resources has its limits. 
 
3.1 Econometric Framework 
 
A panel data analysis may capture both cross-sectional and inter temporal relationships between firm leverage and its 
determinants. Given that our empirical models have a dynamic paneldata context, we use the robust two-step system 
dynamic panel data estimator also known as “system GMM” estimator–proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). In contrast 
to the conventional  ordinary  least square (OLS), Within-Groups and first-difference GMM estimators, the system GMM 
estimator not only mitigates  potential endogeneity  problems,  controls for heterogeneity across individual  firms, and 
removes unobserved  firm-specific fixed effects, but it also allows researchers  to make use of different instruments with  
different lag structure for both  the  levels and  the  first-differenced equations  (Blundell  &Bond,1998, 2000; Bond, 2002). 
Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest using a dynamic panel data estimator based on the GMM methodology that 
optimally exploits the linear moment restrictions implied by the dynamic panel model. GMM estimator uses both lagged 
values of all endogenous regressors and lagged and current values of all strictly exogenous regressors as instruments. 
Models can be estimated  using  the  levels  or  the  first  differences  of  the  variables.  For the difference estimator, the 
variables are measured as first differences and their lagged values are used as appropriate instruments.  
The Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond (Arellano &Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) dynamic panel estimator 
augments Arellano-Bond by making an additional assumption that first differences of instrument variables are 
uncorrelated with the fixed effects. According to this estimator, the lagged levels of variables are likely to be weak 
instruments for current differenced variables when the series are close to random walk. In these conditions, the 
differenced GMM estimates are likely to be biased and inefficient. The authors suggest the use of a more efficient system 
GMM estimator that combines the difference-equation and a levels-equation in which suitably lagged differenced 
variables are the appropriate instruments. It builds a system of two equations (the original and the transformed one) and 
is known as system GMM. The xtabond2 command implements these estimators (Roodman, 2009).  
We applied the Hansen (1982) test for over identifying restrictions and the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for 
autocorrelation to ensure the validity of the instruments that we use in our estimations. More precisely, to test for the 
validity of the instruments, we use the J-statistic of Hansen (1982).  This  statistic  is asymptotically distributed as Ȥ2  with  
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degrees  of freedom  equal  to  the  number  of over identifying  restrictions (i.e., the number  of instruments less the 
number  of estimated parameters). Under the null hypothesis, the instruments are orthogonal to the errors. We employ 
the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation. Under the null of no serial correlation, the test asymptotically 
follows a standard normal distribution. It also provides a further check on the correct specification of the System-GMM 
process. In a dynamic panel data context, the first-order serial correlation is likely to be present, but the residuals should 
not exhibit the second-order serial correlation if the instruments are strictly exogenous. 
 
3.2 Operationalisation of Variables 
 
For the purpose of this study we have chosen to measure leverage by two variables (Welch, 2011): 
[pcs1] the financial-debt-to-capital ratio (financial leverage) that does not consider non-financial liabilities as debt 
• [pcs3 ]the total-liabilities-to assets ratio (balance sheet leverage) that treats financial and non-financial 
liabilities alike 
There are five variables expected to be important as determinants of the capital structure. The remainder of this 
section discusses the exogenous variable and their proxies.  
To control for any possible heteroscedasticity, the natural logarithm is used, while  to ensure linearity in the data, 
due to its capabilities to standardize values thus, bringing them on the same platform for a more efficient analysis to be 
done: 
• [pfsa] natural logarithm of the total assets (Padron et al., 2005) 
• [pfsr] natural logarithm of the total revenue (Titman &Wessels, 1988; Rajan&Zingales, 1995; 
Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Graham, 2000; Ozkan, 2001; Gaud et al., 2005) 
• [pfse]natural logarithm of the number of employees (Asgharian, 1997). 
We use following ratios to measure profitability: 
• [pp1]the return-on-total assets ratio (ROTA) that measures a company's earnings before interest and taxes 
(EBIT) against its total net assets (Rajan&Zingales,1995; Ooi,1999; Ozkan,2001; Gaud et al.,2005) 
• [pp2]the return-on-assets ratio (ROA) that measures a company's net income against its total net assets 
(Wiwattanakantang,1999) 
The proxies for the growth opportunity include as follows: 
• [pg1] the ratio of difference in the book value of total asset between yeart-1 and yeart divided by the book value 
of the total assets in yeart-1 (Titman &Wessels,1988; Ooi,1999; Chen,2004) 
• [pg2] the ratio of difference in total revenues between yeart-1 and yeart divided by total revenues in yeart-1 
(Asgharian, 1997) 
• [pg3] the ratios above are based on a two-year difference in values; we also estimated growth using 
information spanning several years. We run the regression of book value of total assets over ten years on a 
time trend and use the coefficient of the trend, scaled by the book value of the total assets, as a proxy for 
growth (Asgharian, 1997) 
We use the following indicators to measure collateral and/or liquidation value of assets (assets tangibility) which 
are considered to be good candidates for borrowing. 
• [pat1] the ratio of tangible/physical assets to total assets; this measure is the most common one applied to 
determine the collateral value of the assets (Asgharian, 1997). This measurement is expected to be positively 
related to the collateral value of the assets. 
• [pat2] the ratio of tangible/physical assets to total assets; Some intangible assets are not good candidates for 
debt financing because it is difficult to put them to an alternative use (Shleifer&Vishny, 1991) and cannot be 
transferred to another industry when the industry they are employed in suffers an adverse shock. This 
measurement is expected to be negatively related to the collateral value of the assets (Titman &Wessels, 
1988).  
• [pat3] the ratio of inventories to total assets; This measurement is expected to be negatively related to the 
collateral value of the assets. Although debts are used partly to finance inventories, and in most cases 
inventories maintain some value when the firm is liquidated, they do not serve as good collateral. 
• [pat4] the ratio of receivables to total assets; Because of difficulties associated with the collecting receivables, 
including high collections costs, they are not good as collateral. (Asgharian, 1997). This ratio is expected to 
have negative effect on the collateral value of the assets.  
The total revenue volatility [pev] is used as a proxy for a firm-specific risk. Since the focus of this Study is mostly 
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non-publicly traded firms, we follow Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004) to compute the time-varying measure of the firm-
specific risk. We regress the firms' total revenue-to-total assets ratio on firm and year fixed-effects and then we use the 
absolute value of the residuals obtained from this regression as proxy for the firm-specific risk. 
 
 Results and Discussion 4.
 
The data are collected from 26506 companies during the period from 2003 to 2012. Data are unbalanced and for 50% of 
companies, the data are available for a period of 7 years minimum.  
 
Table 3. Number of Companies per Industry and Year 
 
Industry 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
A 255 279 353 355 375 350 413 368 370 377 3.495 
B 14 13 17 13 14 15 17 12 14 15 144 
C 108 117 133 134 139 137 145 144 148 145 1.350 
D 2.961 3.062 3.328 3.567 3.672 3.473 3.537 3.358 3.392 3.399 33.749 
E 74 75 90 100 110 108 132 150 148 145 1.132 
F 1.316 1.365 1.469 1.579 1.639 1.542 1.583 1.454 1.464 1.456 14.867 
G 6.058 6.419 7.164 7.686 7.891 7.306 7.589 6.900 6.996 6.922 70.931 
H 417 437 477 514 524 486 515 489 485 499 4.843 
I 1.301 1.342 1.445 1.561 1.594 1.548 1.552 1.520 1.528 1.525 14.916 
J 46 56 67 78 84 97 98 88 85 87 786 
K 1.624 1.727 1.952 2.148 2.328 2.343 2.570 2.500 2.551 2.620 22.363 
M 94 95 137 111 113 118 185 125 124 129 1.231 
N 64 65 221 77 85 75 217 101 102 110 1.117 
O 326 337 418 415 444 405 492 458 466 473 4.234 
Total 14.658 15.389 17.271 18.338 19.012 18.003 19.045 17.667 17.873 17.902 175.158 
 
Under the assumption that proposed regressors/independent variables are exogenous, estimation of dynamic panel 
models are conducted using the two step Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) through xtabond2 formula in STATA, 
as proposed by Roodman (2009). 
Dynamic panel models are developed for entire sample and subdivided by each industry. Each dynamic panel 
model is tested against the existence of serial correlations with residuals using the Arellano-Bond test and if the 
instruments are exogenous using the Sargan/Hansen test of over identifying restrictions. All two models at the level of 
entire sample (as including some industries) perform rather poorly against Arellano Bond test and Sargan/Hansen test 
indicating issues with serial correlations and endogenity of instruments. 
In the first Dynamic panel model with Financial Leverage - Debt to Capital Ratio= Debt/(Debt +Equity), only 
industries C, M and N don't have serial correlations significant. Instruments in all industries have issues with proposed 
exogenity of independent variables.As presented in the Table 4 in the Dynamic panel model with Balance-sheet Leverage 
- Total liabilities to assets= Total Liabilities/Total assets per most of industries don't have problems with serial correlations 
(except for industry K, and total sample model) where industries A, B, C, E, H, K, and M don't have issues about 
endogenity of instruments. 
Applied remedies to improve serial correlations and endogenity (higher lags, changing variable lists from iv style to 
gmm) yields no better results. Both dynamic panel data models are statistically significant at the level of entire sample 
and per industry. But since the post estimation tests within the first panel model (financial leverage), do not yield the 
required levels, it is going to be left out from the further discussion. The dynamic panel model as describe above do not 
fully respond to data and should be further analyzed using other dynamic panel data models and/or using the balanced 
sample. In this Study, we will focus only on the results of the Dynamic panel model with Balance-sheet Leverage since 
the post-estimations tests are met by most of industries and therefore can be generalized.  
The proposed dynamic panel model (balance-sheet leverage) of the capital structure fails to provide a model that 
describes capital structure change for the entire sample, due to remaining serial correlation between regressors and 
residuals and their endogenity, but does succeed in providing a model of the firm-level determinants for most industries. 
The results confirm the view that differences in industry characteristic lead to an inter-industry variation in the capital 
structure. We observe differences in the basic capital structure of firms in our sample attributable to firm-specific 
characteristics. 
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The number of analyzed companies working at the agriculture, hunting and forestry industry (A) over the period of 
ten years is 2238. The study found that only profitability and asset tangibility is the statistically significant leverage 
predictor for this industry. Profitability, measured with ROA, has a negative influence on leverage. The nexus between 
asset tangibility and leverage is dependent on how the latter is defined. We document that ratio of tangible and intangible 
asset to total assets negatively influences leverage whether the ratio of accounts receivable to total assets has a positive 
influence on leverage. The number of analyzed companies in the fishing industry (B) over the years varies from 10 to13. 
Although the results are statistically significant and post-estimation tests are satisfactory, due to low number of 
companies further analysis is not completed for fishing industry. 
The number of analyzed companies in the mining industry (C) over the ten years amounts to 882. We find a 
robustly significant and inverse relationship between profitability and the capital structure. The results also relieved a 
negative relationship between the asset structure measured by tangible assets and the capital structure choice.The 
number of analyzed companies in the production and distribution of electric energy, gas and water industry (E) is 701. 
Among all the firm-level variables, only profitability (ROE) is observed to have a negative relationship with the leverage. 
 
Table 4. Dynamic Panel Model - Balance sheet Leverage 
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The number of analyzed companies in the accommodation and food service industry (H) over the ten years is 10235. The 
results suggest that four out of five analyzed firm-level variables are statistically significant for this industry. We found a 
strong negative relationship between profitability and leverage ratio. The estimated coefficients for our two profitability 
proxies are both statistically significant, though with bigger magnitudes when we use ROTA then ROA. We also find 
evidence that tangible assets are negatively related to the leverage while the ratio of inventories to total asset positively 
affects the leverage ratio. Another robust result is positive relationship between leverage and the growth rate measured 
by total revenue growth. The results demonstrate that riskier companies (measuring risk as the within-firm volatility of 
earnings) tend to be less total leveraged.  
The number of companies in the real estate industry (K) over the ten years has been 15766. This is the only 
industry for which all firm-level determinants showed significant coefficients. The firm size, measured by total assets, has 
a positive relationship with the leverage ratio, which can be interpreted that larger firms (firms with larger total assets) 
have more access to outside financing in general. ROA as proxy for profitability document an inverse relationship with 
leverage. Asset composition measured by level of tangible assets available is negatively related to the leverage ratio 
while the same variable measure by the ratio of accounts receivable to the level of total asset is positively related to the 
leverage. All three proxies for growth opportunities are statistically significant predictors of total leverage but with 
inconsistent direction. There is a negative relationship between leverage and the growth rate, if the latter one is measured 
by the annual asset and total sales growth, while there is a positive relationship between the leverage ratio and growth 
opportunities measured as the size of the deviation from average growth of total revenue. Finally, the study indicates that 
risk variable negatively affects the leverage.  
The number of companies in the education industry (M) over the years accounts for 800. For companies operating 
in this industry we could find only two statistically significant firm-level determinants, the profitability and the growth 
opportunities. The first one is negatively while the second one is positively related to the leverage ratio.  
Overall, the variation in the capital structure - total liabilities to assets is explained by 1st lag of the capital structure 
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- total liabilities to assets, profitability (both regressors), assets tangibility (except for - the ratio of intangible assets to total 
assets), growth and earnings volatility.  
A highest change in the capital structure - total liabilities to assets have companies with highest difference in the 
capital structure - total liabilities to assets in comparison with the previous year (change in 1 unit of difference, make app. 
79% of unit increase in the capital structure - total liabilities to assets). The second highest change in the capital structure 
- total liabilities to assets have size of ROA, where for each positive change of ROA for 1 unit it is expected to have app. 
22% of unit decrease in the capital structure - total liabilities to assets. Remaining significant repressors' affectthe change 
in the capital structure - total liabilities to assets from 1 to 5%. In all models per industry change in ROA has negative 
relationships with change in the capital structure - total liabilities to assets and coefficients vary from -0.12 to -0.26. 
A consistent negative relationship with the capital structure - total liabilities to assets is in the ratio of tangible fixed 
assets to the total assets and earnings volatility. Remaining regressors have an inconsistent relationship with the capital 
structure - total liabilities to assets, mainly statistically insignificant. The results indicate that one-period lagged dependent 
variable (total liabilities to assets) has a significant and positive effect on leverage (except for the industry B),indicating 
the existence of adjustment to the target capital structure.  
 
 Conclusion 5.
 
The  research  aimed  at testing the  validity  of  capital  structure  theories  in  the  FBiH. In this paper we have developed 
a model to explain firm characteristics (the micro-factors) determining the capital structure, measured by two dependent 
variables. We conducted our empirical analysis using an unprecedented database with non-financial firms from 14 
different industries based in the FBiH, spanning 10 years of data from 2003 through 2012. The data are strongly 
unbalanced, meaning that we allow firms to enter or leave the sample during the referred period, thus avoiding any 
survivorship bias. We examined the data using a dynamic panel System GMM estimator, which is robust to firm 
heterogeneity and data endogeneity problems. 
The proposed dynamic panel models of the capital structure measured bythefinancial leverage fails to provide the 
models that describe the capital structure change, mostly due to remaining serial correlation between regressors and 
residuals and their endogenity. The proposed dynamic panel model of the capital structure measured by the balance-
sheet leverage fails to provide a model that describe the capital structure change for the entire sample, due to remaining 
serial correlation between regressors and residuals and their endogenity, but succeed to provide model of firm-level 
determinants  at the industry level. The industry in which a firm operates seems to have an influence on the basic capital 
structure decisions of firms in our sample. We observe that the inter-industry differences appear to be a function of how 
the capital structure is defined. This signifies the role that the industry specific operating characteristics and regulations 
play in the firm’s capital structure decisions. 
The empirical analysis also investigates the dynamic behavior of the leverage ratios in our sample. We find that 
capital structure is highly persistent. Indeed, a lagged leverage is the best predictor of subsequent leverage in all 
regressions. So, the proposed regressors have statistically significant relationships with the capital structure of which 
most important is first lagged period of dependent the capital structure variable that explains most of explained variance 
of the capital structure, while profitability (ROA) follows as the next most important determinant of the capital structure. 
Assets tangibility, growth, firm size and earning volatility are statistically significant proxies of the capital structure, but 
with low effects on the capital structure change (2-7%).  
To examine the relationship between the profitability and capital leverage in the FBiH corporate sample, we find a 
strong and robust negative relationship between profitability and the leverage ratio, consistent with most of the extant 
empirical literature (Friend & Lang, 1988; Rajan&Zingales, 1995; Antoniou et al. 2008).  Therefore, we evidenced that 
more profitable firms tend to have less leverage, while less profitable firms tend to have more leverage. Table 4 indicates 
that this inverse relationship persists even after accounting for the influence of industry. Thetrade-offtheory can be 
denied, which assumes a positive connection between the two factors– saying, that the profit making firm strive to utilize 
the interest taxshield via rising loans. This is in line with the pecking order hypothesis suggesting that a company's 
financing process - due to the asymmetric information and thus a high transaction costs, does follows a specific 
hierarchy–using first internal sources available, and only then resort to external finance; first debt and only as a last 
choice to equity. In other words, the evidence that more profitable firms tend to have less leverage while less profitable 
firms tend to have more leverage may also be interpreted as evidence of the firm's limited access to outside financing. 
In the Study, we found inconsistent results for relationship between different proxies for growth opportunities and 
leverage. For the proxies based on the two years differences, whether in total assets or total revenue, the relationship 
was negative. That is in line with the trade-off theory and similar to the findings for developed countries (Banerjee, 
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Hesmati, &Wihlborg, 2004). But the positive correlation was found when the growth rate was measured as the coefficient 
of the trend, scaled by the book value of the total assets, from the regression of book value of total assets over ten years 
on a time trend, which supports the pecking order hypothesis rather than other theories. 
The negative correlation of share of tangible assets and leverage is valid for the whole period, which is in line with 
the evidence from the previous studies (Cornelli, Portes& Schaffer, 1996; Nivorozhkin, 2002). This is due to the 
dominance of short-term debt in total debt, which does not necessarily require collateral. The trade-off theory and the 
agency theory obviously didn’t prevail in this period in FBiH. This means that the company with high fixed assets value 
should employ less debt in its capital structure components and it is vice versa. The company with low level of tangible 
assets seeks for external source of fund, in terms of short-term debt, which does not necessarily require collateral, or 
other forms of non-financial financing.  
We have found the connection proposed by the theory between the volatility of earnings and the level of capital 
leverage. This type of risk negatively influences the liabilities/equity ratio significantly in the examined period. This 
suggests that firms appear to reduce their use of total debt in their capital structure when they face higher risks in their 
own business activities.  
Neither positive nor negative relationship between the firm size and the capital leverage cannot be proved, 
expected for two industries. Those results are opposite with the assumption of the trade-off theory, agency theory and 
signaling approach of positive relationship existence as with the assumption of negative relationship made by pecking 
order theory. None of them could be proved from the FBiH corporate database. 
Finally, the empirical evidence displayed in this Study finds it difficult to demonstrate the validity of the trade-off and 
pecking order theories as stand-alone models. This contradicts the standard academic view that they are mutually 
exclusive perspectives or models. The two models provide very different predictions as to what we should expect to 
observe empirically about financial leverage. However the employment of fairly flexible targets for financial gearing, 
accounts for this discrepancy between the theory and practice.  
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